Behavior Research in Accounting http://scitation.aip.org/ Behavior Research in Accounting Editorial Policy and Style Information http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/i/1&agg=rss <br/> Abstract not available. [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, i (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. A Different Personal Perspective through the Behavioral Accounting Literature http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/203/1&agg=rss Ken T. Trotman<br/> Abstract not available. [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 203 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Determinants of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slack: An Experimental Examination of Pay Scheme and Personal Values http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/87/1&agg=rss Jessen L. Hobson, Mark J. Mellon, and Douglas E. Stevens<br/> ABSTRACT: We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 87 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Differential Evaluation of Audit Evidence from Fixed versus Sequential Sampling http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/65/1&agg=rss Peter R. Gillett and Marietta Peytcheva<br/> ABSTRACT: Does the value of audit evidence depend on whether it was collected using fixed or sequential sampling? Opposing normative views are held by the two main schools of statistical theory: Bayesians say no, frequentist statisticians say yes. We test empirically how using fixed versus sequentia ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 65 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. An Exploration of Accountants, Accounting Work, and Creativity http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/45/1&agg=rss Stephanie M. Bryant, Dan Stone, and Benson Wier<br/> ABSTRACT: In two studies, we explore whether creativity is essentialor antitheticalto professional accounting work. In Study 1, archival analysis of U.S. Department of Labor data indicates that: (1) professional accounting work requires no less creativity than do three competing professions and a di ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 45 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Does Greater Risk-Bearing in Stock Option Compensation Reduce the Influence of Problem Framing On Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior? http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/185/1&agg=rss Kimberly Sawers, Arnold Wright, and Valentina Zamora<br/> ABSTRACT: We examine the extent to which the behavioral agency model reflects the relation between greater risk-bearing in stock option compensation and managerial risk-taking. The behavioral agency model predicts that managers with greater wealth at stake will avoid risky projects that threaten the ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 185 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Primacy or Recency? A Study of Order Effects When Nonprofessional Investors are Provided a Long Series of Disclosures http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/161/1&agg=rss Robert Pinsker<br/> ABSTRACT: Firms have the incentive to aggregate multiple pieces of good and bad news together in a consistent direction (i.e., all positive news or all negative news) and disclose it either sequentially or all together (simultaneously) in order to reduce the risk of stock price volatility or large s ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 161 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Do Managers Intend to Use the Same Negotiation Strategies as Partners? http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/131/1&agg=rss Susan McCracken, Steven E. Salterio, and Regan N. Schmidt<br/> ABSTRACT: Most auditor client management (ACM) negotiations occur between partners and client management; however, managers also attempt to resolve issues with client management. Given that ACM negotiation impacts the financial statements, an understanding of whether the intended negotiation strateg ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 131 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Retail Investors' Perceptions of the Decision-Usefulness of Economic Performance, Governance, and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/109/1&agg=rss Jeffrey Cohen, Lori Holder-Webb, Leda Nath, and David Wood<br/> ABSTRACT: Academic literature and the business press have placed increased attention on the corporate disclosure of nonfinancial information. This study uses a survey of 750 retail investors to examine perceptions about indicators of economic performance, corporate governance policies and performanc ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 109 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. A Proposed Framework for Behavioral Accounting Research http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/23/1/1&agg=rss Jacob G. Birnberg<br/> ABSTRACT: Behavioral accounting research (BAR) is richer today, in the topics covered, the methods used, and the range of sub-areas of accounting in which it is performed, than ever before. This paper offers a framework within which BAR literature can be viewed as a whole rather than in segments, su ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 23, 1 (2011)] published Fri Jan 28, 2011. Additional Journal Content http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/xi/1&agg=rss <br/> Abstract not available. [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, xi (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Editorial Policy and Style Information http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/vi/1&agg=rss <br/> Abstract not available. [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, vi (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Editor's Report http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/i/1&agg=rss <br/> Abstract not available. [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, i (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. The Effects of Trust and Management Incentives on Audit Committee Judgments http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/87/1&agg=rss Anna M. Rose, Jacob M. Rose, and Mark Dibben<br/> ABSTRACT: We investigate the effects of audit committee members' dispositional trust and management incentives on audit committee judgments. Results of an experiment indicate that: (1) When management has incentives to manage earnings, less trusting audit committee members are more likely to support ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 87 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. The Effects of Ingratiation and Client Incentive on Auditor Judgment http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/69/1&agg=rss Jesse C. Robertson<br/> ABSTRACT: Anecdotal evidence from practice suggests clients can influence auditor judgment using ingratiation, a strategic influence tactic through which the ingratiator attempts to induce positive affect to facilitate persuasion. I provide initial academic evidence concerning the effect of ingratia ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 69 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation and Participation in Budgeting: Antecedents and Consequences http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/133/1&agg=rss Bernard Wong-On-Wing, Lan Guo, and Gladie Lui<br/> ABSTRACT: Based on Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Ryan and Deci 2000b; Gagne and Deci 2005), the present research proposes and tests a motivation-based model of participation in budgeting that distinguishes among intrinsic motivation, autonomous extrinsic motivation, and controlled extrinsic motiva ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 133 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Why Are Financial Incentive Effects Unreliable? An Extension of Self-Determination Theory http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/105/1&agg=rss Dan N. Stone, Stephanie M. Bryant, and Benson Wier<br/> ABSTRACT: This paper extends self-determination theory (SDT) to investigate the unreliability of financial incentives as motivators. The proposed model predicts that core financial need beliefs influence financial values, which in turn influence hedonic utility, i.e., happiness. Four financial need ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 105 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. The Effect of Social Confrontation on Individuals' Intentions to Internally Report Fraud http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/51/1&agg=rss Steven E. Kaplan, Kelly Richmond Pope, and Janet A. Samuels<br/> ABSTRACT: Fraudulent activity is often first discovered by employees. Gaining an understanding of how meeting with the transgressor to discuss the apparent fraud (social confrontation) influences individuals' likelihood of reporting fraud to internal recipients is particularly important for various ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 51 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Why Business Unit Controllers Create Budget Slack: Involvement in Management, Social Pressure, and Machiavellianism http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/27/1&agg=rss Frank G. H. Hartmann and Victor S. Maas<br/> ABSTRACT: This paper investigates business unit (BU) controllers' inclination to engage in the creation of budgetary slack. In particular, we explore whether controllers who are involved in BU decision making are more susceptible to social pressure to engage in slack creation than controllers who ar ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 27 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Revitalizing Accounting Ethics Research in the Neo-Kohlbergian Framework: Putting the DIT into Perspective http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/1/1&agg=rss Charles D. Bailey, Irana Scott, and Stephen J. Thoma<br/> ABSTRACT: The authors briefly review neo-Kohlbergian theory and provide an updated, contemporary view of the DIT. With this background, they present a framework for research using the DIT, drawing on Rest's (1986) Four-Component Model. They note the existence of recent developments, including interm ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 1 (2010)] published Fri Sep 10, 2010. Negotiating a Fair Value under Accounting Uncertainty: A Laboratory Experiment http://link.aip.org/link/?BRI/22/109/1&agg=rss Karl J. Wang<br/> ABSTRACT: Using two free-communication bargaining games, this study examines bargaining behavior in a setting analogous to one in which a manager and a verifier negotiate a fair value for an asset over a range of possible values. In the renewable-contract game, the manager and the verifier are allow ... [Behavioral Research In Accounting 22, 109 (2010)] published Tue Jan 26, 2010.